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Defendant, Pro-Tech Restoration dba Stone Carpets (hereinafter "Stone Carpets"), by and
through its counsel, M. Dayle Jeffs, submits the following Appellee's Brief on Appeal:
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this case is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
78-2-2(4) Utah Code, 78-2(a)-3(2)(k) Utah Code, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
POINT I
The Trial Court Properly Denied Mrs. Carrier's Rule 60(b) Motion Attempting to
Add Grounds For Curing The Failed Rule 59 Motion For New Trial.
The court reviews the denial of the Motion for Relief from Judgment and a Motion for
a New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Since the trial court has broad discretion in
granting and denying such motions, the abuse of that discretion is the standard by which the
rulings on such motions will be made. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993); Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 228-29 (Utah
1983); Boyce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1980); Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54
(Utah 1984); cf. Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982). Not only is a
ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion in the discretion of the trial court, but that discretion is quite
broad, Birch v. Birch. 771, P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). The trial judge's determination
will be reversed only if the ruling is so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and
capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993).

POINT n
The Trial Court Applied The Proper Law in Allowing Each Adverse Co-Defendant
The Full Number of Peremptory Challenges.
This defendant asserts that the ruling by the trial court allowing each defendant three
peremptory challenges was based upon a factual determination by the court of adverseness
between the several defendants. A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993); Sorensen v.
Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994); Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Although this defendant contends the trial court did not make an interpretation of law in
awarding the peremptory challenges, to the extent that interpretation of the law is inherent in the
awarding or granting of peremptory challenges, the standard of review for such interpretation
is for correctness. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993);
Bennion v. Graham Resources Inc.. 849 P.2d 569 (Utah 1993).
POINT IH
Mrs. Carrier's Stated Bases For Appeal Do Not Show Reversible Error.
B.

Jury instructions submitted by the trial court were not in error.
Standard of review for examining whether the giving of jury instructions or the failure

to give jury instructions is a non-differential examination for correction. Erickson v. Sorensen.
877 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Stevenson. 82 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1994).

2

C.

The trial court did not err in letting Newell Knight testify.
Standard of review of challenges to a witness' testimony and his presence in the

courtroom are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138
(Utah 1994); State v. Wilkerson. 612 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980). The trial court has wide discretion
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony which are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993); Rees v. Intermountain Health
Care. Inc.. 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).
The challenge to a civil jury trial verdict requires a substantial evidence standard and the
appellate court views all evidence in light most favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involved a car accident between the plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier, and defendant,
William Roger Smith. Smith's employer, Stone Carpets, was joined in the suit on the basis of
respondeat superior and Pleasant Grove City was joined on the basis of its alleged negligence
for not properly maintaining a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred.
(Amended Complaint, R. 28-34.)
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the number of defendants' peremptory
challenges. (R. 381.) The court denied plaintiffs motion, finding diverse interests between the
defendants, allowing plaintiff and each defendant three peremptory challenges to the main panel
and each party one peremptory challenge as to the alternate juror.
3

Upon completion of the trial, the jury unanimously held that plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier, had
no cause of action.

The jury found that Mrs. Carrier was sixty percent negligent; that

defendant, Roger Smith, was forty percent negligent; and that Pleasant Grove City had zero
negligence in the accident. The jury verdict issued on August 24, 1993. (R. 828-830.)
On September 1, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
[Rule 50] and Motion for a New Trial [Rule 59]. (R. 860-861.) In her memorandum in
support, plaintiff did not assert as a basis for a new trial that the trial judge had erred in granting
each defendant separate peremptory challenges nor the denial of her Motion to Limit Defendants'
Peremptory Challenges. Plaintiff also filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion on
September 30, 1993, and again did not raise the issue regarding peremptory challenges. (R.
863-886.)
During the first part of October, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in Randle
v. Allen. 223 Ut. Adv. Rep. 6 (Oct. 8, 1993), which addressed the issue of peremptory
challenges when there are multiple defendants. However, the plaintiff did not bring this case
to the district court's attention before it ruled on the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or For a New Trial. On October 29, 1993, the court entered its
order denying plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for a
New Trial based on the issues raised in plaintiffs motion. (R. 1008.)
Subsequently, on November 12, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief From Order
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 60(b). (R. 1010-1011.) The
4

memorandum in support of Motion for Relief from Order Denying New Trial failed to
acknowledge that the Motion N.O.V. and for New Trial had not included a claim regarding
peremptory challenges. Plaintiff, as if attempting to amend her failed Rule 59 motion, cited
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for the first time noted the Randle decision,
arguing that the district court's original denial of plaintiffs Motion to Limit the Defendants'
Peremptory Challenges was incorrect. (R. 1013-1024.)
On November 24, 1993, after considering the Randle decision and respective memoranda
and oral argument, the trial court denied plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. 1047-1048.) The
district court stated, orally and in its order, that it had found at the time of qualifying the jury
that there was sufficient adverseness between the defendants to justify granting each defendant
separate peremptory challenges. Upon the denial of the Motion for Relief from Order Denying
the Motion for New Trial, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 1036.2-1036.3.)
In a further attempt to obtain a new trial, plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition of the Appeal on December 23, 1993, arguing that the trial court committed
"manifest error" in denying plaintiff's motions and asking the Supreme Court to reverse the trial
court's denial of plaintiff s Motion for Relief from the Order Denying a New Trial on the basis
of Randle v. Allen. Each of the defendants filed separate memoranda in opposition to plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Disposition of the Appeal.

5

The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs motion to summarily reverse, preferring to defer
"ruling until plenary consideration and disposition of the case." Ruling denying Summary
Disposition, January 10, 1994, attached as Exhibit "D".
Defendant, Stone Carpets, insists in this brief that, not only did the trial court not err in
denying plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion, but the trial court carefully considered and properly
determined that the defendants were adverse parties, as required under Randle. The granting
of peremptory challenges was therefore correct and not reversible error.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Within ten days following the rendering of the jury verdict, plaintiff filed a Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial, pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of the granting of peremptory
challenges to the defendants in the motion. On October 29, 1993, the trial court denied the
combined motion.
On November 12, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the
Motion for a New Trial under Rule 60(b).

Plaintiff raised the issue of the number of

peremptory challenges given the defendants in the Motion. The court correctly denied that
motion on November 23, 1993. Because the Motion for Relief from the Order could not
encompass a new issue not raised in the initial Motion for a New Trial filed within the ten day
mandatory period, it gave no valid basis for changing the previous denial of the Motion for a
New Trial. The court could not consider the 60(b) motion as an attempt to extend the time for
6

filing the Motion for a New Trial as it was past the jurisdictional time limit for a Motion for a
New Trial.
In denying the Motion for Relief from Order Denying the Motion for New Trial, the
court pointed out that at the initial trial of this matter the court had found adequate adverseness
between the respective defendants to comply with the decision cited in Randall v. Allen which
had now been cited to the court.
The trial court had before it and considered the adverseness between the respective
defendants and correctly ruled that the adverseness entitled each defendant to three peremptory
challenges.

The court applied not only the standard set forth in Sutton v. Otis Elevator

Company, but met the criteria of the new standard prescribed by Randall v. Allen.
Interpretation of Rule 47(c) as urged by plaintiff and the interpretation of Randlev. Allen
as urged by plaintiff would be in derogation of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. (Exhibit "A" attached.)
If the court were to adopt the strictness urged by the plaintiff, it would be a violation of
the immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the requirement that defendants
share peremptory challenges, would deprive the defendants of due process as guaranteed under
the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and treats them differently than
plaintiff as applied in this case. (Exhibit "A" attached.)
In addition to the other constraints on the interpretation of the Rule 47(c) as urged by the
plaintiff, the strict application of it requiring the sharing of peremptory challenges is in
7

derogation of Article I, Section 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution requiring uniform operation
and application of the law. (Exhibit "B" attached.) The cases decided by the Utah Supreme
Court in similar situations and supportive of defendant's interpretation are Johnson v. Stoker.
685 P.2d 539 (1984); Malen v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (1984); Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt
Lake. 817 P.2d 816 (1991); and Lee v. Gaufin. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 30, 1993).
In addition to plaintiffs interpretation being in derogation of both the U.S. Constitution
and Utah Constitution; the requirement for shared peremptory challenges by defendants would
work an injustice in its application and prevent the parties from having the benefit of the counsel
to advocate on behalf of his client only and not to acquiesce in conflicting decision making by
other parties and counsel.
The determination of adverseness between parties on the same side of a case is a factual
determination to be made by the trial court in its advantaged position in being able to view all
that has transpired or is about transpire in determining whether or not to allow defendants to
exercise separate peremptory challenges.

In this case, the trial court found substantial

controversy between the defendants and properly allowed them separate peremptory challenges.
The claim by William Smith that his employer Stone Carpets had instructed him to falsify
facts pertaining to the occurrence of the accident and the conflicting testimony of Stone Carpets
that no such conversation ever took place created hostility and animosity. Plaintiff exploited that
hostility in calling them as early witnesses, demonstrating to the jury the conflict between their
testimony.
8

Mrs. Carrier's complaints of the jury instruction is not borne out by the record. Plaintiff
attempted to have the court instruct the jury exclusively on plaintiffs theory of right-of-way and
not that which was supported in the record. The trial court correctly submitted to the jury both
plaintiffs theory and the defendants' theory on right-of-way by paraphrasing the applicable
statutes in a fashion that fairly presented to the jury the factual issues to be decided by the jury.
Contrary to the assertions of Mrs. Carrier, the record shows that when plaintiff called
the accident reconstructionist engaged by the City of Pleasant Grove as her witness, the crossexamination was within the permissible scope of cross-examination allowed by the court and the
complained of interpretation of the statute by Newell Knight was elicited from Mr. Knight in
the re-direct examination by plaintiffs counsel, thus opening the door to an issue that now
plaintiff asserts as error. The record before the court demonstrates that the question was fully
appropriate and within the sound discretion of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Trial Court Properly Denied Mrs, Carrier's
Rule 60(b) Motion Attempting To Add Grounds For
Curing The Failed Rule 59 Motion For New Trial.
A.

Grant of peremptory challenges was not stated as basis of motion for new trial.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict [Rule 50] and for a

New Trial [Rule 59], on September 1, 1993, within the 10 days required for filing said motions.
Plaintiff asserted as grounds for such motion the unusual schedule, abuse of discretion in
9

admitting Newell Knight's testimony and in modifying a jury instruction, and lack of evidence
supporting the jury's verdict, but did not assert the grant of peremptory challenges as grounds
for said motions.
Plaintiff did not attempt to amend her motion to include a claim of error in granting the
full number of challenges within the 10 day period. Upon denial of the Rule 59 motion on
October 29, 1993, plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the Motion for
New Trial under Rule 60(b) on November 12, 1993. In this motion plaintiff sought relief from
the Order Denying Motion for New Trial of October 29, 1993, "based upon a recent
development in the law, specifically the Utah Supreme Court's ruling of Randle v. Allen.
supra." Plaintiff claimed, for the first time since the jury rendered its verdict, that the court
erred when it granted the full number of peremptory challenges to each party. However, since
plaintiff had not based her Motion for New Trial on any alleged error in granting peremptory
challenges, the trial court properly denied both the Motion for New Trial and the ensuing
Motion for Relief from the Order Denying the Motion for New Trial. The Rule 60(b) motion
cannot be used to reverse a denial of a Motion for a New Trial by asserting an issue (peremptory
challenges) not raised in the underlying motion.
B.

Plaintiff cannot bring Rule 60(b) motion to extend time for amending Rule 59
motion.
Plaintiff first raised the issue of peremptory challenges in her pre-trial motion to limit the

number of peremptory challenges given each defendant, and should have raised it in the Rule

10

59 Motion for New Trial if intending to rely on it. However, having failed to state the
peremptory challenge issue as grounds for a new trial in a timely and appropriate motion,
plaintiff attempted, in effect, to untimely amend that motion by filing the Rule 60(b) motion
nearly twelve weeks after the jury verdict. "When such an untimely motion is made, the trial
court's only alternative is to deny the motion." Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah
1982). By granting the Rule 60(b) motion, the trial court would have effectually extended
plaintiffs time for filing an amended Rule 59 motion. A court may not extend the time for
either a Rule 59 or a Rule 60(b) motion, Goddard v. Bundy. 121 Utah 299, 310, 241 P.2d 462
I
(1952), denial of the Rule 60(b) motion was proper. See also. Boskovich v. Utah Const. Co..
123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (Utah 1953) (10 day period for filing motion for new trial cannot
be enlarged). In Goddard. appellants contended that they should be relieved of a default in the
motion for new trial because they had filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion. The court held,
however, that this argument was not sound, since it would wrongfully allow a Rule 60(b) motion
to extend the time limit of Rule 59, id. at 309-10. Having unsuccessfully prevailed upon the
trial court, and upon the Supreme Court to summarily reverse denial of this second motion,
plaintiff appeals.
C.

Denial of Motion for Relief is within discretion of trial court.
The granting or denying of a Rule 60(b) motion is within the "discretion of the trial court

and will not be upset on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion."
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While counsel for plaintiff argues in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Relief from Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial that, due to a change in law,
relief is "in furtherance of justice," page 3, he fails to give any explanation or excuse for
neglecting to raise the peremptory challenge issue in the Motion for a New Trial. Just as when
bringing a motion for relief on the basis of new evidence, "the moving party must show that 'by
due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and produced' before judgment was
rendered," Hall, supra at 229, citing Boyce. supra at 995, plaintiff in this case should have to
show why the issue on which the law supposedly changed could not have been brought to the
attention of the trial court at the time the Rule 59 motion was considered. Although Randle was
not yet decided at the time the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff was
aware of the peremptory challenge issue, having raised it in her pre-trial motion before jury
selection began, and should have raised it in the Motion for New Trial in order to rely on it later
in asking for relief from the court's denial of the new trial motion.
Furthermore, in basing the motion on "new" law, plaintiff should be required to show
that the change was of "sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there
would have been a different result," Doty, supra at 995, as is required when basing a motion
for relief on new evidence. In this case, there could be no such showing, since the trial court
had already found the "substantial controversy" Randle requires to grant each defendant the full
number of peremptory challenges. The issue of adverseness between the defendants is a factual
issue which is examined under an abuse of discretion standard.
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Plaintiff was aware that the trial court had granted the full number of peremptory
challenges based on "disparate interests" (Transcript, July 15, 1993), but chose not to include
that as a basis for the Motion for New Trial. She could not then argue that this ground could
not have been raised before the order on the new trial motion was rendered, just because she
was reminded of that argument when the Randle decision was rendered. In order to have taken
advantage of that "new law", plaintiff would have had to plead the issue in her motion, or
prevail on a motion for relief based on excusable neglect. Inasmuch as the issue was not raised
at the time the motion for new trial was made, and plaintiff did not assert excusable neglect, the
Randle case would not have changed the trial court's deliberation on the stated grounds for new
trial, so the court did not abuse its discretion in the decision rendered.
POINT H
The Trial Court Applied The Proper Law
In Allowing Each Adverse Co-Defendant The
Full Number Of Peremptory Challenges.
A.

Plaintiffs reading of Randle runs counter to the more flexible rule recommended in
Sutton,
Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]ach party shall be

entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of this
rule." Subsection (c) states that "[w]here there are several parties on either side, they must join
in a challenge before it can be made." The Utah Supreme Court has issued two opinions that
interpret the language set forth in Rule 47(c) and its predecessor statute.
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In the earlier of the two cases, Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co.. 69 Utah 85, 249 P. 437
(Utah 1926), the plaintiff was injured by a defective elevator and sued the company that installed
the elevator as well as the Bonneville Hotel where the elevator was located. At the trial level,
the defendants each sought the same number of peremptory challenges as the plaintiff.
However, the trial court ruled (under the statute substantially identical to the present Rule 47(c))
that the defendants were joint parties on the same side of the lawsuit and consequently, together
they would only receive collectively the number of peremptory challenges as the plaintiff
received individually. The Otis Elevator Company appealed, arguing that Bonneville Hotel and
Otis Elevator Company were adverse parties, each entitled to their own peremptory challenges.
Id. at 93-95. The Supreme Court in Sutton held that it was prejudicial error to require codefendants to exercise their peremptory challenges together when their interests are hostile and
adverse. Id. at 141. It further explained that extra peremptory challenges should be granted to
multiple parties if there is "a substantial controversy between them respecting the subject matter
of the suit." IcL In its decision, the court analyzed similar cases in other jurisdictions and
adopted the rule followed by courts in Texas, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Id. at 145. The cases
reviewed determined there is a substantial controversy between parties when "their defenses are
essentially different, especially when these are hostile, defendants must necessarily sever in their
answers, and, as each has a distinct issue to maintain, we think that each is to be considered a
[separate] party." Id at 139 citing Hundhausen v. Atkins. 36 Wisconsin 518.
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This rule, as applied by the court to the facts in Sutton, showed that the parties were
"hostile" to each other, that their answers were severed, that they pleaded different defenses,
and consequently, that they were adverse parties.
First of all, the court stated that the defendants in the case, the hotel company and the
elevator company, filed separate answers and "were represented by separate counsel." Id at
134. The defendants also filed answers that were materially different from each other. Id The
court also pointed out that, while the defendants did not file a cross-claim against each other,
there was sufficient evidence to show that the hotel company would have had an action against
the elevator company. Id. at 135. Furthermore, throughout the litigation, the court quoted
examples of the defendants' hostility towards each other. Id. at 135-137. Finally, the court
stated that, in its opinion, the intent of the legislature in formulating the statute was not to adopt
a strict construction, but instead to interpret it liberally because a strict construction would lead
to injustice in many cases. Id at 144. Consequently, the court found a substantial controversy
between the two parties and ruled that the trial court had committed prejudicial error by not
allowing each party its own peremptory challenges. Id. at 145.
More recently, the Supreme Court considered co-parties rights to separate peremptory
challenges in Randle v. Allen, supra. In Randle. plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit against the
Utah Department of Transportation, Salt Lake County and Carl Allen, as a result of an
automobile accident which occurred between plaintiffs wife, Mrs. Randle, and defendant, Carl
Allen. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that Allen negligently operated his vehicle and that
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UDOT and Salt Lake County were negligent for design and maintenance of the intersection
where the accident occurred.
In Randle. the court stated that it adopted the rule set forth in Sutton. "We believe, in
accord with Sutton, that extra peremptory challenges should be allowed only when a substantial
controversy exists between the co-parties, (emphasis added.)" However, instead of adopting
the analysis the court used in Sutton to determine whether there was a substantial controversy,
the court in Randle characterized it differently, stating "that a substantial controversy exists when
a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect,
a separate distinct lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and defendants." Id.
at 7. The court's statement in Randle concerning what constitutes a substantial controversy
actually cuts against the reasoning of the court in Sutton and if applied to the facts in Sutton
would have changed the result of the Sutton court's decision. In Sutton the co-defendants did
not file cross-claims against each other, but the court still found that their interests were
sufficiently adverse to grant them separate peremptory challenges. Sutton. 69 Utah at 134,145.
Furthermore, the Sutton court stated that it favored a more liberal interpretation of the statute
and that a strict construction of the statute could lead to injustices. IcjL at 144.
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B.

The provision of Rule 47(c) requiring agreement on the exercise of peremptory
challenges is in derogation of the United States Constitution.
1.

Equal protection under the 14th Amendment to individual defendants.

Neither the Sutton case nor the Randle case had presented to the court the issue of
whether or not the provision in Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or its
predecessor statute requiring parties to join in their peremptory challenges, as applied in the
Randle case, constitutes any violation of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
to the United States. In pertinent part that provision provides,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws (emphasis added).
In Raymond vs. Chicago Union Traction Co.. (1907) 207 U.S. 20, 52 L. Ed 78, 28 S.
Ct. 7, the U.S. Supreme Court held that provisions of the 14th Amendment are not confined to
action by the state through its legislature, but apply also to its executive and judicial authorities
and to all instrumentalities by which the state acts by virtue of public position under state
government. See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles. 227 U.S. 278, 57 L. Ed 510, 33
S. Ct. 312 (1913) (holding, "Prohibitions and guarantees of the 14th Amendment are addressed
to, and control, not only states, but also every person, whether natural or juridical, who is
repository of state power.") While it may be argued that the granting or denial of peremptory
challenges of perspective jurors is not a constitutional right, it cannot be disputed that the state
through Rule 47, having given to various parties in litigation the right to peremptory challenges,
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must apply that state power with equality to all persons affected thereby. If the interpretation
of Rule 47(c) effectively deprives some litigants of rights granted to other litigants in the same
case by providing defendants only a proportionate share of peremptory challenges proportionate
to the number of defendants in the litigation; be that one each or one challenge for three
defendants; the application of the rule is in disharmony with the mandates of the 14th
Amendment requiring equal protection to all persons affected thereby.
The most limited application of the interpretation urged by plaintiff would require Stone
Carpets and William Smith to share three peremptory challenges. Each defendant is named
separately in the case; because of the adverseness and hostility each, under the Code of
Professional Responsibility is required to have separate counsel; but under plaintiffs claim each
would only have one half of the amount of peremptory challenges as plaintiff, even if they could
agree. If they could not agree, they would be deprived of peremptory challenges entirely.
2.

An unduly restrictive basis for finding adverseness would violate the
privileges and immunities clause.

This defendant maintains that under Sutton and cases in surrounding jurisdictions, the
trial court is given discretion to predicate the allocation of peremptory challenges on factual
determinations of adverseness, not only upon the simple determination of whether the parties
have filed cross-claims against each other. To impose such a significantly more restrictive rule
on co-defendants in Utah, when defendants in other states stand a far better chance of being
granted the full number of peremptory challenges, would deny Utahns their constitutional right
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to enjoy the same privileges and immunities under the 14th Amendment as United States citizens
in other states.
3.

A strict requirement that defendants share peremptory challenges deprives
defendants of due process as guaranteed under the 5th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.

In debating the meaning of the statutory requirement that "the parties on either side"
share peremptory challenges, the Sutton court pointed out the possibility that a strict rule
requiring co-defendants to share peremptory challenges "puts it in the power of the plaintiff to
deprive the real party sought to be charged of the right to interpose even one peremptory
challenge," 68 Utah 143. To name a defendant in a suit, and then deprive that defendant of the
same right to challenge any of the jurors that the plaintiff may exercise, is to deny due process
to such defendant, in derogation of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The courts
should not be applying a rule which deprives any party of due process in its application.
Furthermore, denial of peremptory challenges denies a defendant of effective
representation of an attorney, a right inherent in the concept of due process. While demographic
studies or psychological evaluations in appropriate cases may provide insight into probable juror
bias or inclination in appropriate cases, the short time frame between disclosure by the court of
the panel to be called for juror examination and the limited opportunity to examine each juror
as to the nuances of the jurors' education, work history, family relationships, kinds of
association, reading materials and past experience, gives great importance to the exercise of
peremptory challenges. If counsel is not allowed to challenge a juror in order to protect the
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interests of the client, the client is denied effective representation and may be deprived of
"property, without due process of law." (5th Amendment, U.S. Constitution).
The instincts and intuitions of the party litigant and counsel for the party litigant are a
fundamental basis for eliminating through peremptory challenges, those jurors, for any of myriad
of reasons, believed by the party or their counsel to be disfavored towards their cause. The
hundreds of hours of time in preparation for the defending of the case now before the court
develops thought processes, concepts and thinking which are part of the attorney's work product
and which are not shared with counsel for other defendants or with the court or plaintiffs
counsel. They are part and parcel of the exercise of peremptory challenges in order to assure
due process.
The ethical considerations mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
the exercise of the utmost integrity on the part of the advocate attorney to exercise peremptory
challenges in a way he or she and the client conceive are in the clients best interest in the
litigation. These thought processes cannot be compromised in an effort to acquiesce in the
sharing of peremptory challenges. Either a requirement to share or an outright denial of
peremptory challenges limits the effectiveness of counsel to protect the interests of the client.
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C.

PlaintifPs argument for the application of Rule 47(c) is in derogation of Article I,
Section 11 & 24 of the Utah Constitution.
In neither the Sutton nor the Randle cases did the court, ruling on the issue of peremptory

challenges, consider or discuss the requirements of Article I, Section 24, of the Utah
Constitution which provides, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
In Stanton v. Stanton. 421 U.S. 7, 43 L Ed.2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 1373, (1975), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a state law prescribing a lower age of majority for females than males
was discriminatory and denied equal protection of the laws in the context of child support. The
Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Stoker. 685 P.2d 539 (1984), held that the Utah Aircraft
guest statute violated the equal protection principles of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution and was thus unconstitutional. In the analysis of Rule 47(c), the litigants should
have presented and the Court should have considered whether or not the application of the rule
pertaining to the exercise of peremptory challenges also constituted a violation of the state
constitutional provision requiring all laws of a general nature to be uniform in operation. The
issue is whether or not the application of the provisions pertaining to peremptory challenges was
unconstitutional because it treats defendants different than plaintiffs by allowing plaintiffs three
peremptory challenges, but requiring defendants or parties to one side to share peremptory
challenges. This could apply in any case where there are multiple parties on one side and single
parties or lesser number of parties on the other side.
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In a similar case, Malen v. Lewis, supra, the Supreme Court held that the Utah
Automobile guest statute was unconstitutional as a violation of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution for unequal application to tort victims. In Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake.
817 P.2d 816 (1991), the Court held that Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires
that a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. That statutory classification must
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has
not considered Rule 47(e) and (c) as it might be impacted by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution. In considering plaintiffs appeal, this court should consider the constitutional
mandate as interpreted by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
As stated in Lee v. Gaufin. supra, a law that is uniform on its face may still be
unconstitutional under this section [Utah Constitution, Section 24], since the critical issue is
whether the operation of the law is uniform. The law does not operate uniformly if similarly
situated persons are not treated similarly or if persons in different circumstances are treated as
if their circumstances were the same. The court held that a heightened standard of scrutiny
should be applied in cases which implicated rights protected under Article I, Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution as well as under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. The following
discussion will show that such injustice occurs through violations of the U.S. Constitution, the
Utah Constitution and basic fairness. Defendant maintains that the operations of Rule 47(c) as
urged by Mrs. Carrier would deprive this defendant of rights guaranteed by both sections of the
Utah Constitution.
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D.

A strict rule requiring peremptory challenges to be shared would work injustice
other than the constitutional violations.
Plaintiffs interpretation of Randle suggesting that a trial court can find "substantial

conflict" only when co-parties file cross-claims against one another would impose a rule that
applies form over substance. By requiring "cross-claims" to prove adversity, the court is
encouraging more litigation and is failing to analyze the realities of the situation that may exist
between the two parties. Under current Utah law, employers cannot file cross-claims against
their employees acting within the course of their employment.

So by predicating the

determination of allocating peremptory challenges on the filing of cross-claims, the Randle court
is forcing two parties to share peremptory challenges who may have extreme hostility and
adversity between each other and who are precluded from filing cross-claims against each other.
The rights of either party, or of both parties, could be seriously jeopardized if they cannot agree
on peremptory challenges.
Considering the difficulty of applying the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court and
approved by the legislature under Rule 47 which requires multiple defendants to join in
peremptory challenges, a strict rule requiring all defendants to share in peremptory challenges
could leave one or more parties without a chance to object to potentially biased perspective
jurors. Hypothetically, if there were ten defendants named by the plaintiff, and only three
peremptory challenges allowed for the defendants' side of the case to coincide with three
peremptory challenges afforded the plaintiff, then seven of the ten defendants, if they could not
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reach agreement on exercise of peremptory challenges, would be deprived of any exercise of a
peremptory challenge. Read strictly, Rule 47(c) mandates an agreement between the parties that
may be not only hostile to each other, but each may have a valid difference in the exercise of
their peremptory challenges based upon each parties and that party's counsel's view of
characteristics and perceived propensities of the particular perspective jurors.
The problem inherent in requiring co-parties to share peremptory challenges was
recognized in Sutton. That court explained that if the rule requiring all "parties on either side"
to join
means the parties on either side as the same appear in the title of the case, then in many
cases it puts it in the power of the plaintiff to deprive the real party sought to be charged
of the right to interpose even one peremptory challenge, much less three, which is the
number allowed by the statute. . . . In such case the plaintiff would have his three
challenges and the defendants none, unless they could agree. The controversy between
the defendants in such case might be more sharp than the controversy between plaintiff
and defendants, still they must be considered on the same side, simply because they have
been so arranged by the plaintiff in the title of the case. (Emphasis added.)
Sutton. 68 Utah at 142. This concern is expressed by Donald E. Evins in the annotation, Jury:
Number of Peremptory Challenges Allowable in Civil Case Where There are More Than Two
Parties Involved, 32 A.L.R. 3d 747, 769 & 786 citing International-Great Northern R. Co. v.
Smith. 269 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Citing Mourisen v. Hansen. 20 A.2d 84 (Conn.
1941), Evins points out that when there are several plaintiffs or defendants, to require that all
parties on one side of the case to share challenges "might mean that one or more would have
no right of challenge at all," id., a clear injustice.
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If the court were to impose a rule mandating that hostile parties, who would have
opposing views of which jurors should be stricken, simply because those parties find themselves
all named as defendants, it would be requiring the impossible.
As in the present case, as an example, where the co-defendants had formerly been in an
employer/employee relationship, both parties may recognize that a prospective juror, having just
been laid off of work, is predisposed to sympathize with the fired employee and against the
employer. If that prospective juror is not dismissed for cause, the employer would desire to use
a peremptory challenge, yet the employee would want the juror to remain, and they would not
be able to agree on the use of the shared peremptory challenge. "[I]t could well be that persons
acceptable to one would be wholly unacceptable to another on the same side," Sutton, id. To
require that hostile parties named on the same side of a case agree in order to exercise a
challenge would be manifest injustice.
The Rule 47(c) mandate that co-defendants must exercise peremptory challenges
cooperatively ignores the reality that separate counsel and their clients perceive different jurors
or different characteristics of jurors to be contrary to their best interests in the context of the
presentation of their advocacy and without regard to the other parties perception. The mandate
to share requires an agreement, where an agreement is not possible or where it is unfair, and
compulsory sharing would result in not being able to exercise peremptory challenges as to those
jurors that are the most offensive to the specific defendant, but require it to be exercised as to
jurors that are somewhat unacceptable to both or all parties.
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A concurrence with plaintiffs interpretation of the Randall decision in applying it to
multi-defendant cases would result in an inequity to each individual defendant. If plaintiff is to
have three peremptory challenges and four defendants are to share three peremptory challenges
does one of the four get three and the other three get none or three of the defendants get one
each and one defendant have none. This inequality is even more severe than the claimed
inequality asserted by the plaintiff because the plaintiff in the action elected to bring suit against
all three defendants. Plaintiff could have brought suit against Stone Carpet and Pleasant Grove
who had admittedly adverse interests and restricted the defendants to three peremptory challenges
each or plaintiff could have commenced suit against the driver only. It was the plaintiff
denominating three separate defendants that foreshadowed the necessity of each defendant being
given their own peremptory challenges.
Plaintiff argues that the plaintiff is put at a disadvantage if all defendants are given the
full number of peremptory challenges, since the cumulative number of challenges of defendants
exceeds the number of challenges plaintiff may exercise. However, by choosing to name several
defendants in one suit, the plaintiff has created this disadvantage for herself.
There are independent issues in view of the statutory prohibition in §78-27-40, Utah Code
Annotated, which in pertinent part provides, "No defendant is entitled to contribution from any
other person." Thus, the application of a restrictive rule which requires that a substantive crossclaim must be the predicate to a request for separate peremptory challenges may be the very
basis for the concern of the Sutton court, at page 144, when it adopted a more liberal
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interpretation of the statute and warned that a strict construction of the statute could lead to
injustices.
Also, with the decreasing incentive to file cross claims, a "substantial conflict" rule based
on whether or not a cross-claim was filed would be unduly constraining. In 1986, the Utah
legislature repealed the statute providing for contribution among joint tort-feasors in tort cases,
significantly diminishing the incentive for a co-defendant to file a cross-claim and rendering the
filing of cross-claims almost non-existent. Instead of couching a rule in terms of complying with
a procedural requirement, that of filing a cross-claim, the court should adopt the rule that it
applied in the Sutton case, where it looked at substance over form and set guidelines in
determining whether parties' interests were truly adverse to one another. That decision also
recognized the necessity of the trial court, who could exercise a "hands-on" evaluation,
exercising its discretion in determining adverseness.
E.

Defendant's interpretation of Randle as the clear case illustration is more consistent
with previous and surrounding law.
Plaintiff, interpreting Randle. suggests that "[i]n order for the trial court to award more

than one set of peremptory challenges to a side, the co-parties must file cross-claims against each
other," Brief of Appellant, page 15. To attribute such a conclusive and short-sighted holding
to Randle, however, would be to hyper-extend, if not completely misconstrue, its significance.
If Plaintiffs interpretation of Randle were adopted, it would establish a rule requiring that
Sutton, which Randle cites as the authority for the "significant controversy" rule, Randle. at
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1332, be overturned. Furthermore, it would run counter to the great weight of jurisprudence
in surrounding jurisdictions.
Plaintiff apparently takes his interpretation of Randle from the Supreme Court's
declaration that, in its view,
a 'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-claim
against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct lawsuit from the action
existing between the plaintiffs and defendants.
Counsel for Defendant Stone Carpets suggests that while this statement identifies the clear case
of when parties are positioned adversely, it does not restrict the trial judge from considering
other significant facts in each case to determine whether a party is adverse or whether
"substantial controversy" exists.
The Supreme Court did not state that "a 'substantial controversy' only exists" in the
situation where cross-claims are filed. Instead, it appears to be identifying a case where there
is little doubt that a substantial controversy exists. This determination was sufficient to decide
Randle under its specific facts, since there was a distinct and formal cross-claim between
defendants therein. Consistent with a policy of limiting a court's ruling to the case being
decided, the Supreme Court could have decided that case clearly without having to expound a
more general rule that would decide in advance any future cases that might arise under less
conclusive facts, such as the case here on review.
That the court in Sutton found sufficient evidence of "substantial controversy" between
the defendants although "a cross-claim was not filed in the case by the hotel company against
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the elevator company," Sutton, at 135, suggests that plaintiffs reading of Randle does not reflect
the extent of the law in Utah. Just as "the mere fact that appellant and the hotel company were
joined as defendants in the action is not conclusive that they were on the same side within the
meaning of the above statutes," 68 Utah at 134, the mere fact that a cross-claim was not filed
is not conclusive that no substantial controversy exists. To so hold would require overturning
Sutton, and the Supreme Court expressed no such intent in Randle. Rather, it seemed to rely
on the law as set forth in Sutton, since it cited it frequently, Randle. 862 P.2d at 1332-33.
To arrive at the result asserted by plaintiff, this court would have to find either that in
deciding Randle the Supreme Court overruled Sutton or it did not carefully consider the facts
giving rise to that earlier decision. An easier and more plausible explanation of the Randle
statement concerning cross-claims is that the Supreme Court was stating a clear rule that would
decide that particular case, and was not preventing trial courts from considering all factors
indicating adverse status of co-parties in cases yet to come.
There is some indication in Randle that the Supreme Court found limited discretion on
the part of a trial judge in Utah to find substantial controversy "simply because [the co-parties']
defenses or claims rested on different facts," Randle. at 1333. However, the Court's brief
disposition of several cases from other jurisdictions on the basis that it "[did] not find that degree
of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47" not only imposes a far stricter rule in Utah
than in neighboring jurisdictions, but also goes far beyond the Sutton determination of
"substantial controversy," requiring something more like "extreme controversy."
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F.

Determination of adverseness for purposes of allocating peremptory challenges
involves more factual determinations than only whether cross-claims have been filed.
The "more liberal rule" recommended in Sutton, and followed in several jurisdictions,

recognizes the unique advantage of the trial judge in determining the nature of the various claims
and the adversity of the parties. The trial judge is in the best position to assess conflicting
interests, to decide whether they constitute "substantial conflict" in the case at bar, and should
therefore be given discretion beyond merely determining whether a formal cross-claim was filed.
In the case now on appeal, the trial court recognized early in the case that substantial
conflict had arisen to the degree that defendants sought separate counsel, filed separate answers,
and would view prospective jurors differently. The trial court determined that each should
receive the same number of peremptory challenges.

Plaintiffs presentation of evidence

attempted to dramatize and discredit the individual defendants, and her emphasis on the claimed
hostility and alleged lying by both the employer and employee, dramatized the adverseness
between Smith and his former employer, and confirmed the correctness of the trial court's
decision that the parties were sufficiently adverse to warrant peremptory challenges to each.
Subsequent argument at trial, including plaintiffs vigorous exploitation of the controversy, see
Transcript, Vol. II-R. 1312, copy attached as Exhibit "E", affirmed that in making this decision
the trial court had been sensitive to the various interests involved in the case, had foreseen the
parties' adverse positions, and had ruled appropriately under the given circumstances.

30

Other jurisdictions recognize the special vantage point of the trial judge, and the judge's
discretion in determining the extent of adversity among parties and in granting peremptory
challenges. For instance, in Texas, when
considering the number of peremptory challenges to be allocated between the
litigants or sides, the trial court must determine, based on the information gleaned
from pleadings, pre-trial discovery, and representation made during voir dire
examination, what antagonism, if any, exists between the parties.
Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt. 718 S.W. 2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986).
This determination of antagonism is based on the cumulative proceedings, not just on the filing
of a cross-claim. Similarly, in New Mexico, the trial court may consider several factors in
determining adversity, including
1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; 2) whether separate answers were
filed; 3) whether the parties interests were antagonistic; and, 4) in a negligence claim,
whether different independent acts of negligence are alleged in a suit governed by
comparative negligence.
Carraro v. Wells Fargo Mtg. & Equity. 744 P.2d 915, 918 (N.M. App. 1987). In determining
diversity of claims, the court must rely on the pleadings and assertions of the parties, id. "This
determination of a preliminary question rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion," id., citing Morris v. Cartwright. 258 P.2d
719 (N.M. App. 1953).
The Supreme Court in Randle, while discounting cases from states in which "courts have
been more liberal," Randle, at 1333, in an apparent attempt to establish a rule in Utah granting
less discretion to the trial judge, failed to recognize that the "more liberal rule" championed in
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Sutton suggests that Utah law on peremptory challenges is not, or should not be, so different
from that applied in other states.
G.

The trial court found substantial controversy between defendants and properly
allowed the full number of peremptory challenges.
Analysis of the facts of the case on appeal in light of Sutton and Randle shows that, in

the interest of justice, the defendants here are individually entitled to their own peremptory
challenges under Rule 47(c).
In Sutton, where the plaintiff filed suit against the elevator company and the hotel where
the elevator was located, the court demonstrated that the defendants' interests were adverse by
showing that they had filed separate answers, retained separate counsel, presented significant
variations in their answers, and their interests were hostile to each other. Furthermore, the court
indicated that even though the defendants had filed no cross-claims against each other, it was
sufficient to show that if a judgment was entered against one party, it may present a substantial
cause of action against the other party. Id. at 135.
Applying those facts to this case shows that the defendants here were entitled to separate
peremptory challenges. In this case different counsel represented Stone Carpets, its former
employee, Roger Smith, and Pleasant Grove City. While it is true that initially Mr. Jeffs
represented both Stone Carpets and Roger Smith, it was precisely because of the adverse
interests and lack of cordial understanding that Mr. Jeffs withdrew from representing Mr. Smith
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and new counsel appeared for him. At that point, if not earlier, the parties' separate interests
and the hostility that existed between them became apparent.
Roger Smith was an employee of Stone Carpets and was the driver of the vehicle that
was involved in the accident. At first, he and Stone Carpets were represented by the same
counsel, M. Dayle Jeffs. However as the case progressed, Mr. Smith requested new counsel
because of allegations on his part that his former employer, Stone Carpets, requested him to
"lie" concerning the facts of the accident. At the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff called
Mr. Smith and Mr. Stone as his first two witnesses and dramatically brought out to the jury the
hostility that existed between them due to Mr. Smith's assertion that Joe Stone of Stone Carpets,
met with him after the accident and told him to misrepresent to the investigators the
circumstances of the accident. See trial testimony of Roger Smith, (copy attached as Exhibit
"F").
However, Joe Stone denies ever having had the alleged conversation with Roger Smith.
Specifically in trial testimony, he denies ever meeting with Mr. Smith and ever asking him to
change his story about the circumstances surrounding the accident. It is unlikely that Mr. Stone
would encourage misrepresentation of that sort since it would negatively affect his interests.
Obviously, these two parties have truly adverse interests in the case and since both were
accusing the other of lying about what happened, it would have been impossible for both Roger
Smith's and Stone Carpets' interests to have been protected if they had to share counsel or their
peremptory challenges.
33

H.

Plaintiff admitted that interests of Pleasant Grove City were adverse, and court
determined interests of other defendants to be adverse to each other as well.
Counsel for plaintiff has admitted that the interests of Pleasant Grove City were adverse

to the interests of the other defendants. See first page of Transcript, July 15, 1993, attached to
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 2, in which Mr. Harris declares "I clearly will not dispute Pleasant
Grove City has disparate interests..." Nevertheless, a brief discussion will emphasize that the
other parties defendant had "disparate interests" and were indeed adverse to one another.
The plaintiffs theory that Pleasant Grove City was negligent because it failed to discover
and replace a missing stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred is completely
different from the theory alleged against Roger Smith and Stone Carpets. Consequently, the
defenses used by Pleasant Grove City were completely different than those used by Stone
Carpets or Roger Smith.

Thus, Pleasant Grove City is in a very similar position to the

defendant, Mr. Allen in Randle. The plaintiffs theory of negligence against Mr. Allen was
brought on a totally different basis than it was against the other two defendants. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mr. Allen was sufficiently adverse from the other defendants to be entitled to
separate peremptory challenges. Randle. 223 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. Even under the stricter of
"substantial controversy" indicated in Randle. the interests of Pleasant Grove City and the other
defendants are clearly adverse.
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The Randle court stated at page 7,
To avoid favoring one side of a lawsuit over another, a trial judge must carefully
appraise the degree of adverseness among co-parties and determine whether that
adverseness truly warrants giving that side more challenges than the other.
In the case at bar, the court did exactly that and in denying plaintiffs Motion From Relief From
the Order denying plaintiffs Motion for Judgment N.O.V. and for New Trial, the court
specifically stated that at the time it ruled on plaintiffs pre-trial motion to limit defendants'
peremptory challenges, the court had determined that there was sufficient adverseness to
necessitate granting each defendant separate peremptory challenges under Rule 47. See second
page of pre-trial Transcript, July 15, 1993 attached to this brief as Exhibit "2", in which court
finds that "by the nature of the case" the defendants' interests were sufficiently adverse to
warrant granting each the full number of peremptory challenges.
Where the court has carefully considered the factual issue of adverseness and made a
specific ruling as to the adverseness of the respective defendants, this court should defer to the
trial court's factual determination and affirm the denial of plaintiff s motion under an abuse of
discretion standard. The record and factual determinations adequately support the trial court's
decision and preclude a determination that the grant of three plus one peremptory challenges was
on abuse of discretion.
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I.

The falsified claim against Stone Carpets by defendant Smith destroyed any entente
cordiale.
Following discharge of Mr. Smith by Stone Carpets these two defendants were in fact

antagonistic. The asserted perjurious contention by defendant Smith that his former employer
had encouraged him to make a false statement to the court destroyed the cordial understanding
considered by some courts in determining controversy between parties. See, e.g.. Donald E.
Evins, Annotation, Jury: Number of Peremptory Challenges Allowable in Civil Case Where There
are More Than Two Parties Involved, 32 A.L.R. 3d 747, 769 & 786 citing International-Great
Northern R. Co. v. Smith. 269 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (apparent entente cordiale
between defendants cited as justifying requirement that they share peremptory challenges). This
lack of friendly understanding put the defendants in the position of "hostile" adverse parties for
whom it would be an impossible task to compel agreement on shared peremptory challenges.
It was therefore appropriate that each be given an equal number of challenges.
POINT m
Mrs. Carrier's Stated Bases For Appeal
Do Not Show Reversible Error
Mrs. Carrier raises several issues that have been carefully reviewed by the trial court not
only in the Memoranda in Support of the Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New
Trial, but also in the hearing on the Motion for Relief from Order denying Motion for New
Trial.
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A.

Negligence of Pleasant Grove not addressed herein.
Mrs. Carrier argument that the jury erred in finding that Pleasant Grove City was not

negligent in this case will not be addressed herein by defendant Stone Carpets since that issue
is not germane to defendant Stone Carpets.
B.

Jury instructions submitted by the trial court were not in error.
In Point III of Appellant's Brief p. 24, Mrs. Carrier asserts that the trial court erred in

refusing to give the right-of-way jury instruction offered by plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier. The
standard of review for the claim of error in giving of jury instructions was stated in State v.
Carter. 256 UAR Rep. 3, 17, where the court said:
Whether a trial court correctly refused to give a particular jury instruction as a
question of law. Accordingly, we grant no particular deference to the trial
court's ruling. James. 819 P.2d at 798 (citing Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133
(Utah 1989)). As we stated in James . . . "'the trial court is not required to give
any requested jury instruction if it does not comport with the facts or does not
accurately state the applicable law.'"
This defendant agrees that each party is entitled to have its theory presented to the jury,
but not to the exclusion of the opposite parties theory. Mrs. Carrier has failed to marshall the
evidence most supportive of the verdict and to demonstrate the inadequacy of the instruction
given. Mrs. Carrier asserts on p. 25 of their brief, the evidence presented by Mrs. Carrier and
her expert witness, Rudolph Limpert, in which he purports the evidence shows that the parties
entered the intersection approximately at the same time. He fails to address or provide the court
with the testimony supportive of the instruction and the verdict.
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The testimony of Thomas Blotter, the accident reconstruction expert engaged by Stone
Carpets, placed the plaintiff 126 feet from the point of impact at the time Stone Carpets'
employee entered the intersection.

(Transcript, Vol. VII-R. 2215-2217.)

(Exhibit "G"

attached.)
The testimony of Newell Knight, the accident reconstruction expert engaged by the City
of Pleasant Grove, said the evidence showed that Stone Carpets' employee, William Smith
entered the intersection first. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2478:15-18.) (Exhibit "H" attached.)
The eye witness, Arlin Shupe, testified that at the time William Smith entered the
intersection, he saw the plaintiff, Mrs. Carrier a substantial distance from the intersection in his
view between the house and the pine tree.

(Transcript, Vol. III-R. 1666.)

(Exhibit "I"

attached.) Thus, the testimony of the eye witness and the expert witnesses presented a fact issue
for the jury to decide on whether or not Smith entered the intersection clearly first or whether
they entered it at approximately the same time.
Plaintiff requested her jury instruction No. 19, which was an instruction in part taken
from Utah Code Annotated 46-6-72(2), which only presented that portion of the statute which
addressed the issue of whether or not the drivers entered the intersection at approximately the
same time, but included an additional paragraph creating a presumption of negligence, copy
attached as Exhibit J. (R. 597.)
Stone Carpets initially submitted its jury instruction No. 45, copy attached as Exhibit K.
(R. 702.) This instruction presented Stone Carpets theory and its evidence recited above by the
38

witnesses that Mr. Smith entered the intersection first and the instruction was taken from 46-672(1) verbatim.
The City of Pleasant Grove requested in its instruction No. 36 (R. 646, copy attached
as Exhibit L), in which it paraphrased both facets of the Title 41-6-72, (1) and (2).
Thereafter, Stone Carpets submitted its supplemental instruction No. 55 which gave the
provisions of 41-6-72(1) and 41-6-72(2) verbatim. (R. 553, copy attached as Exhibit M.)
The court elected to give instruction No. 31, which was an adaptation of the statutory
provisions and of the City of Pleasant Grove's instruction. (R. 781, copy attached as Exhibit
N.) (A copy of 41-6-72 is attached as Exhibit "D".) Thus, the court presented to the jury both
the plaintiffs theory on who had the right-of-way as supported by her expert witness and her
own testimony and the defendant's theory who had theright-of-wayat the intersection supported
by the testimony of the eye witness, Arlin Shupe, Stone Carpets' expert witness, Dr. Thomas
Blotter and the City of Pleasant Grove's expert witness (called by plaintiff), Newell Knight.
As stated by this court in Erickson v. Sorensen. 882 P.2d 144 at 155:
While plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to give two specific
instructions, '[w]e review jury instructions in there entirety and will affirm when
the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the case.'" State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992).
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that a party cannot object to jury
instructions unless at the time of trial they objected to them.
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With regard to plaintiffs jury instruction No. 19, it is instructive that the "objections"
raised by plaintiffs counsel is recorded in the Transcript R. 2532:24 and continuing on to R.
2533, wherein counsel states in line 7, "In essence, my instruction was given" she objected to
failure to include the final paragraph on her requested instruction No. 19, which is not the
statement of the law. Exhibit "O" attached.
Again, with regard to the instruction given the so called objection to instruction No. 31
shown in the Transcript R. 2538:2-10, wherein counsel said, "This is the one right-of-way
instruction which does not take the exact language of the statute. It combines both of the
potentially applicable statutes in to one. It again uses-reduces it to prose . . . it nevertheless
could be done more accurately, more clearly done for the jury if it was broken into two
instructions and use the statute itself." Exhibit "P" attached.
The trial court had before it the exact wording of both parts of the applicable statute in
Stone Carpets instruction No. 55, attached herewith as Exhibit M, R. 558. The court elected,
rather than give the full statute verbatim requiring the jury to interpret and apply all of the
subparts to the statute, to paraphrase it as related to the facts presented in this case presenting
both plaintiffs theory and defendant's theory of the right-of-way issues. As such, the trial court
fairly represented the theories of the respective parties, and when viewed as a whole together
with the instructions on negligence and approximate cause, fairly presented to the jury a correct
statement of the law. It was not error to give the instruction as the court did.
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Under Utah law, the key to determining whether a jury instruction is so improper as to
be grounds for reversible error is "if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party."

Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991) citing

Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989). In the case on appeal
the jury instruction paraphrasing the whole statute was less misleading to the jury than the
instruction citing only a part of the statute submitted by Mrs. Carrier would have been. Since
Mrs. Carrier jury instruction was incorporated into an instruction blending the legal theories of
both parties, the substitution of Mrs. Carrier's jury instruction was not prejudicial to Mrs.
Carrier, and therefore not reversible error.
C.

The trial court did not err in letting Newell Knight testify.
1.

Testimony of Mr. Knight was necessary to clarify deposition excerpts.

Mrs. Carrier claims that by allowing Newell Knight, an expert retained by counsel for
the City of Pleasant Grove and originally deposed by plaintiff, to be present and explain his
deposition when Mrs. Carrier's counsel only desired to read portions of Mr. Knight's deposition
out of context, the court committed reversible error. This argument fails to recognize that the
trial court allowed Mrs. Carrier's counsel to read all of the sections he desired to introduce from
the Knight deposition, (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2440:1-5.), but in response to an objection as to
the foundation of Mr. Knights testimony, the court called Mr. Knight as a witness, apparently
to avoid misrepresentation of his statements. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439.)
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Counsel for Mrs. Carrier asserts that the production of Mr. Knight was procured over
his objection. That is not accurate. Mrs. Carrier's counsel suggested the reading of selected
parts of Mr. Knight's deposition and when that was objected to, the Court informed all parties
that Mr. Knight would have to be present and then Mrs. Carrier's counsel could use the
deposition as he saw fit. Mrs. Carrier was therefore able to introduce the desired statements
from the deposition, yet defendants were able to show those statements in the context of the
entire deposition, as they would have been under Rule 32, which provides that depositions may
be used only "so far as permissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness
were then present and testifying." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32.
Under this rule, defendant would have been able to read portions of the deposition to
show the foundation and context of Mr. Knight's responses as read by plaintiff. However, since
Mr. Knight was available to testify, and apparently to avoid the difficult application of the
somewhat artificial standard for admitting deposition testimony "as though the witness were
there," the court instead required Mr. Knight to be present. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439.)
Considering that a jury is better able to understand the statements being presented when the
witness can be cross-examined, the introduction of testimony to explain statements from a
deposition minimizes the chance that a jury will be misled. Mr. Knight's testimony was the best
evidence of his opinion as to the actual events contributing to the accident. The decision of the
trial court to have Mr. Knight present assisted the jury in determining the facts of the accident,
without giving legal conclusions as to who was negligent, and should be sustained.
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Mrs. Carrier insinuates that because City of Pleasant Grove had listed Mr. Knight as its
witness, but had opted not to call him to testify, it had "attempted to hide him from the jury,"
Brief of Appellant at 28. This argument is particularly ironic now that plaintiff, having
introduced Mr. Knight's testimony herself, is asserting that testimony as grounds for a reversal.
Once Mrs. Carrier chose to call Mr. Knight, Defendants were entitled to cross-examine him,
and when Mrs. Carrier perceived, after the fact, that Mr. Knight's testimony had not advanced
her case, she claimed error, and would now have the testimony "hidden."
2.

Cross-examination addressed foundation for testimony and matters on direct
examination.

Mrs. Carrier asserts in her Statement of Facts that defendant Stone Carpets' crossexamination "invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law," Brief of Appellant at 11, and cites to
the Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2477:21-23 as evidence thereof. An examination of the transcript,
however, shows that this assertion is inaccurate. Counsel for Stone Carpets initially crossexamined Mr. Knight (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2472-2478, Exhibit "H" attached). There were
no questions asked on cross-examination of Mr. Knight asking him to interpret the traffic code
or any statute.
On cross-examination, Mr. Jeffs questioned Mr. Knight to set a foundation for his
opinion as to who had theright-of-way,based on who entered the intersection first. (Transcript,
Vol. X-R. 2476-77.) Mr. Jeffs did not refer to a statute or ask Mr. Knight to interpret it. In
response to the question as to who, in his opinion, had the right-of-way, Mr. Knight stated
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merely "Mr. Smith did. He got there first." (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2478.) This answer
reflects that he based his response on the events of the accident, and was not reading nor
interpreting Utah law. In truth, the statute was never discussed until Mr. Harris, counsel for
Mrs. Carrier, brought it out in re-direct examination. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2479:12-21.)
Through several episodes of voir dire and cross-examination, counsel for Stone Carpets
questioned Mr. Knight in order to lay the proper foundation for the testimony he was giving a
response to plaintiffs direct examination. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2472-78, 2484-85, 2493-96.)
This examination elicited Mr. Knight's opinion as to who arrived at the intersection first, and
did not mention the statute until plaintiffs counsel, in his re-direct examination, inquired of Mr.
Knight of his interpretation of the applicable traffic code provisions on right-of-way at an
intersection. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2479-2484.)
Plaintiffs counsel called Mr. Knight as his witness, elicited the colloquy on the
interpretation of the statute and now complains of the results of that inquiry, including the
further cross-examination of issues raised by his own re-direct examination. Defendant's line
of questioning in initial cross-examination and Mr. Knight's response shows that the opinion
given by Mr. Knight was based upon his assessment of specific occurrences at the time of the
accident rather than on an interpretation of law.

The cross-examination of Mr. Knight,

therefore, did not exceed the scope of direct.
The approach followed in Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 1991),
cited by Mrs. Carrier as requiring the exclusion of legal conclusions, would not restrict the line
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of questioning conducted by Mr. Jeffs in the case on appeal. In Davidson, the same expert was
retained to testify of circumstances surrounding an accident in which a cattle truck overturned.
As an expert witness, "Knight was allowed to testify as to everything except his final conclusion
that defendant was negligent." I(L at 1231.
Mr. Knight was allowed to give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason appellee's
truck overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was traveling too fast
for the curve, what the speed limit was at the curve, whether a person hauling
livestock should be concerned with his load and what the concerns should be, and
whether a person hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the
truck overturned. Indeed, the only evidence the trial court excluded was Knight's
conclusion regarding whether appellee was negligent.
Id. Mr. Knight's testimony in that case was not unlike his testimony in this one, in that he
responded to questions concerning the specific events and circumstances of the accident. He was
not questioned as to legal conclusions of who was negligent. Rather, that decision was left to
the jury.
The Davidson case is also helpful in identifying the standard of review when an expert
testifies:
In reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, we give deference to the trial
court's advantageous position, and do not overturn the result unless it is clear the
trial court erred. See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920,
923 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.) ("It
is generally held that the trial court has discretion to determine the suitability of
expert testimony in a case."), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Davidson. 813 P.2d at 1230. This deference to the trial court is necessary because, as Davidson
points, "[t]here is no bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that

45

call for overbroad legal responses," id. In the 1990 case, Whitehead v. American Motor Sales
Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, the Utah Supreme Court said:
The proper scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse.
The trial judge is in the best position to assess whether testimony should be allowed or excluded.
The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328, rejected the argument
that the opinion of an expert invades the province of the jury. The Court stated:
The old shibboleth that an expert should not be permitted to invade the province
of the jury has been largely displaced by recognition that opinions, if based on
adequate foundation, are helpful and that the powerful tool of cross-examination
and the jury's good judgment are sufficient to place the opinion in proper
perspective.
The court went on to say:
That of course, is not to say that the jury, with its own common sense, and the
assistance of penetrating cross-examination, cannot adequately evaluate that
opinion in light of alternative explanations, the degree to which the opinion
reasonable follows from the facts, and all other relevant considerations.
The admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in large measure
upon the foundation laid.
In this case, the foundation that was laid to show that Mr. Knight has vast experience
with the Utah Highway Patrol, as an accident reconstructionist, and learned accident
investigator, qualified him to render opinion as to the right-of-way and as to who entered the
intersection first.
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Mrs. Carrier intended to "introduce the deposition of Defendants' own witness, Newell
Knight" to impeach defendants' case. (Brief of Appellant p. 28.) In fact, Mr. Harris had taken
Mr. Knight's deposition and knew that Mr. Knight's opinion was that Mr. Smith entered the
intersection first. (Excerpts of the Deposition of Newell Knight are attached hereto marked
Exhibit "Q" and by reference made a part hereof.) Use of portions of the deposition to indicate
otherwise would be misleading, which was the basis of Mr. Jeffs' objection to just reading
selected parts of the deposition when Mr. Knight was available to explain his answers to the
questions asked by Mr. Harris. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2438:24-25, 2439:1-4.) Therefore, the
trial court acted properly in allowing Mr. Knight to testify. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 2439:5-6.)
Mrs. Carrier's characterization of Newell Knight as a "rebuttal witness" is highly
debatable. Mr. Harris called Mr. Knight and read those parts of the deposition which he
believed would be corroborative of the testimony given earlier by Mr. Limpert, Mrs. Carrier's
expert. Mr. Knight's testimony only confirmed, however, that Mr. Limpert's computations
were correct, but contradicted the factual determinations from those computations as to who
arrived in the intersection first. Even before his direct examination was complete, the voir dire
examination demonstrated that Mr. Knight was not a rebuttal witness at all but was intended to
be corroborative of Mrs. Carrier's case in chief and Mrs. Carrier's expert. Mrs. Carrier,
realizing that Mr. Knight's testimony did not had this intended effect, now appeals on the ground
he should not have been allowed to testify, though it was Mrs. Carrier's counsel himself who
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brought in Mr. Knight's deposition.

The realization by Mrs. Carrier that Mr. Knight's

testimony did not ultimately promote her case as she anticipated is not grounds for reversal.
CONCLUSION
Co-defendants in a lawsuit have the right to separate peremptory challenges if their
interest are sufficiently adverse to one another. A close examination of the facts in this case
compared with the facts of the Sutton and Randle cases show that the defendants here have
sufficient adversity to be entitled to separate peremptory challenges.

In addition, the

constitutional issues raised herein should not be ruled upon without full briefing and
consideration by the entire court. Accordingly, defendant, Stone Carpets, respectfully requests
that this court deny plaintiffs motion for summary disposition.
DATED and signed this j 2 / ^day

of February, 1995.

M. Dayle JefJ?7
^
Attorney for Defendant
Pro-Tech Restoration
dba Stone Carpets
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EXHIBIT A

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

EXHIBIT B

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I

Sec. 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

Sec. 24.
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

EXHIBIT C

ARTICLE 9
RIGHT-OF-WAY
41-6-72- Right-of-way between vehicles — Unregulated intersection.
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by
an official traffic-control device shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle that
has entered the intersection from a different highway.
(2) Except as specified in Subsections (3) and (4), when more than one
vehicle enters or approaches an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time and the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control signal is inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, the operator of the
vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right
unless otherwise directed by a peace officer.
(3) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by
an official traffic-control device, from a highway that does not continue beyond the intersection, shall yield the right-of-way to the operator of any vehicle on the intersecting highway.
(4) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection not regulated by
an official traffic-control device, from a highway that is not paved, shall yield
the right-of-way to the operator of any vehicle on a paved intersecting highway.

EXHIBIT D

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

January 10, 1994
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys at Law
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

Shirley Carrier,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,
Pro-Tech Restoration dba
Stone Carpets, William
Roger Smith, and Pleasant
Grove City,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 930579
910400680

Plaintiff's motion to summarily reverse is this day
denied, and the court defers its ruling until plenary
presentation and consideration of the case, Utah R. App. P.
10(f).
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

~"2D
JAN 1 1 199$
JEFFS a JEFFS

EXHIBIT E

VOL II-Doc.# 1312
PROCEDURES.
I GET A PHONE CALL LAST WEEK FROM MR. CHIPMAN
THAT SAID:

I'M GOING TO BE FAXING YOU SOMETHING TODAY.

WE FOUND SOMETHING.

I'M INTERESTED ENOUGH TO ASK

MR. FRYE AND MR. CARTER WHY ALL OF A SUDDEN A WEEK
BEFORE TRIAL I'M GIVEN THIS DOCUMENT.
ANSWER TO THAT.

I DON'T KNOW THE

I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT.

BUT

IT IS CLEAR FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE IN THIS
SITUATION, FROM MR. STONE AND MR. SMITH, POINTING THEIR
FINGERS AT EACH OTHER, ONE SAYING YOU TOLD ME A LIE, THE
OTHER SAYING YOU'RE A LIAR, AND THEN YOU HAVE PLEASANT
GROVE CITY THAT IS LESS THAN STELLAR IN CARRYING OUT AN
INVESTIGATION SO WE COULD HAVE SOME ANSWERS.

ONE OF

THESE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATORS IS GOING TO SAY IT SURE
WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE SOME PHOTOGRAPHS OR
MEASUREMENTS.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE A RESTING

PLACE TO FIGURE OUT WHAT'S GONE ON.

THEY'RE GOING TO

HAVE TO TAKE VERSIONS OF WHO SAID WHAT, WHAT VERSIONS
WERE WHERE, AND TRY AND PIECE TOGETHER WHAT THE SPEEDS
OF THESE VEHICLES ARE.

AND LET ME TALK ABOUT THAT FOR A

MINUTE.
DR. LIMPERT IS GOING TO TELL YOU, AS I
SAID -- LET ME STRIKE THAT AND BACK UP.

AS I'VE TOLD

YOU, IT HAS BEEN A CONCERTED EFFORT OF MR. SMITH AND
STONE CARPETS ON DAY ONE TO PLACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

EXHIBIT F

VOL III-Doc.# 1517
Q.

WHEN DID THAT PURCHASE BEGIN; WAS IT BEFORE

JHE COLLISION OR AFTER THE COLLISION?
A.

JULY 1ST.

Q.

SO YOU ONLY HAD LIKE THREE OR FOUR DAYS?

A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

IT WAS A SITUATION WHERE HE WAS GOING TO SELL

YOU THIS CAR AND JUST TAKE OUT PAYMENTS OVER TIME?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

SO YOU DIDN'T HAVE THE CAR VERY LONG BEFORE

IT GOT WRECKED?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

NOW, YOU SAY THAT THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE

IN A CONFERENCE ROOM AT STONE CARPETS WITH JOE AND JIM
PRESENT?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

WERE YOU THE ONLY OTHER EMPLOYEE PRESENT?

A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

AND IT WAS IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE UPCOMING

INVESTIGATION; IS THAT CORRECT?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

WHAT WERE YOU TOLD BY MR. STONE?

A.

TO SAY THAT WHEN —

THROUGH THE INTERSECTION.

I SLOWED DOWN TO LOOK

WHEN I PROCEEDED TO GO

THROUGH THE INTERSECTION THE VAN STALLED AND IT SLOWLY
WENT THROUGH THE INTERSECTION.

IT DIDN'T START BACK UP.

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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AND MS. CARRIER CAME UP THE HILL AND WRECKED INTO ME.
MR. JEFFS:

I'M GOING TO MOVE TO STRIKE THE

ANSWER AS NOT RELEVANT AND NOT PROBATIVE.

IT HAS NO

RELATIONSHIP TO THE THINGS AT ISSUE AND CERTAINLY IS NOT
FOR IMPEACHMENT.
THE COURT:
Q

I'LL PERMIT IT TO REMAIN.

(BY MR. HARRIS)

DID HE TELL YOU WHY HE

WANTED YOU TO TELL WHOMEVER ASKED YOU THE VERSION — I
DON'T WANT TO RESTATE IT, BUT THE VERSION YOU JUST
RELATED, DID HE GIVE YOU A REASON?
MR. JEFFS:

OBJECTION, MAY I VOIR DIRE?

THE COURT:

YOU MAY.

MR. HARRIS:

IF IT'S FOUNDATION OR SOMETHING,

I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PURPOSE OF VOIR DIRE IS.
THE COURT:

I'LL PERMIT IT.

GO AHEAD.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q.

MR. SMITH, DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION AFTER

THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE TO YOU THAT YOU'VE ALLEGED
MR. STONE MADE, THAT HE GAVE YOU ANY REASON WHY HE SAID
THAT YOU SHOULD SAY THE VAN STALLED?

DO YOU HAVE ANY

RECOLLECTION OF SUCH -- HIM SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT WHY?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

YOU DO?
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A.

YES.

Q.

WAS IT SAID IN THE SAME CONVERSATION?

A.

YES, SIR.
MR. JEFFS:

OKAY.

MR. HARRIS:
JESTION?

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO REPEAT THE

DO YOU REMEMBER THE QUESTION?

CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. HARRIS:
Q.

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO REPEAT THE QUESTION?

DO

•YOU REMEMBER THE QUESTION?
DID JOE STONE GIVE YOU A REASON WHY YOU WERE
^SUPPOSED TO TELL THESE INVESTIGATORS THAT THE VAN
STALLED AND SLOWED, AND SHIRLEY WAS GOING UP THE HILL
AND HIT YOU?
A.

BECAUSE THIS LADY IS GOING TO SUE US FOR A

LOT OF MONEY.
Q.

DID HE ALSO TELL YOU THAT IT WAS TO GIVE US

MORE TIME TO PUT IT IN HER FAULT?
MR. JEFFS:
[ SUGGESTIVE.

OBJECTION.

IT'S LEADING AND

HE CALLED HIM AS HIS WITNESS.

THE COURT:

HE'S STILL AN ADVERSE WITNESS.

I'LL PERMIT THE QUESTION.
THE WITNESS:

I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE WHOLE

OBJECTIVE, YES.
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Q

(BY MR. HARRIS)

NOW, DO YOU REMEMBER ANY

OTHER REASONS, OTHER THAN THE TWO THAT WE JUST TALKED
ABOUT, THAT WAS GIVEN TO YOU BY MR. STONE AS TO WHY HE
WANTED YOU TO SAY WHAT HE WANTED YOU TO SAY?
A.

NO, SIR.

Q.

WERE YOU AWARE WHEN HE ASKED YOU TO DO THAT,

THAT THAT WASN'T TRUE; WHAT HE WAS ASKING YOU TO SAY WAS
NOT TRUE?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

IT'S DIFFERENT -- WHAT HE WAS ASKING YOU TO

SAY IS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT YOU TOLD THIS JURY HAPPENED
EARLIER TODAY, CORRECT?
A.

PARDON?

Q.

YOU AND I WENT THROUGH WHAT YOU REMEMBER

HAPPENING ON JANUARY 15TH, RIGHT?
A.

YES, SIR.

Q.

AND WE TOLD THE JURY ABOUT THAT 20 MINUTES

AGO OR SO, RIGHT?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND WHAT MR. STONE ASKED YOU TO DO AS

COMPARED TO WHAT YOU TOLD THE JURY A FEW MINUTES AGO IS
NOT THE TRUTH?
A.

NO, SIR.

Q.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY COMMENTS OR STATEMENTS BY

EITHER JIM OR JOE STONE TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY EXPECTED
CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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yOU TO DO THIS AS AN EMPLOYEE OF STONE CARPET?
A.

NO, SIR.

Q.

DID YOU HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY

EXPECTED YOU TO DO THIS AS AN EMPLOYEE OF STONE CARPET.
MR. JEFFS:

OBJECTION, CALLS FOR A

CONCLUSION.
THE COURT:
Q

I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION.

(BY MR. HARRIS) AFTER, DID YOU HAVE AN

UNDERSTANDING THAT IN ORDER TO KEEP YOUR JOB AT STONE
CARPET, YOUR TWO WEEK JOB AT STONE CARPET, THEY EXPECTED
YOU TO GO OUT AND GIVE THESE VERSIONS TO THE UPCOMING
INVESTIGATORS?
MR. JEFFS:

OBJECTION, CALLS FOR PURE

SPECULATION ON HIS PART AS TO THEIR THOUGHT PROCESSES.
THE COURT:

I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION.

MR. HARRIS: WHAT I'M ASKING FOR IS HIS
UNDERSTANDING.
MR. JEFFS:

IT'S NOT RELEVANT WHAT HIS

UNDERSTANDING WAS.
THE COURT:

I'VE SUSTAINED THE OBJECTION,

COUNSEL.
Q

(BY MR. HARRIS)

THERE CAME A TIME SHORTLY

AFTER THIS CONVERSATION WHERE YOU WERE CONTACTED BY AN
INVESTIGATOR, CORRECT?
A.

YES, SIR.
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THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS TO THE POSITION

OF THE TOYOTA VAN?

1

A-

USING THE SPEED OF 28.5 MILES PER HOUR, THE

TOYOTA VAN WOULD HAVE BEEN 126 FEET BACK OF THE POINT OF
IMPACT, THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT.
Q.

WOULD YOU, USING A PEN, DRAW THAT ON THE

EXHIBIT 134.
A.

I'M GOING TO PLACE THE FRONT END OF THE

TOYOTA 126 FEET BACK FROM THE TOYOTA AS POSITIONED AT
THE POINT OF IMPACT.

AND AT THAT TIME IT WOULD BE THREE

SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT.
Q.

AND DID YOU ALSO MAKE A TIME/DISTANCE STUDY

TO DETERMINE THE POSITION OF THE DODGE VAN THREE SECONDS
PRIOR TO IMPACT?
A.

YES.

Q.

WHAT POSITION DID YOU DETERMINE THAT TO BE?

A.

WELL, THERE ARE TWO OR THREE POSSIBILITIES.

IF I USE THE ONE THAT COMES CLOSEST TO THE ANALYSIS,
IT'S 10 FEET PER SECOND, 6.8 MILES PER HOUR.

SO IN

THREE SECONDS WE WOULD BE -MR. MORIARITY:

YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, I OBJECT

ON THE GROUNDS HE'S TALKING ABOUT POSSIBILITIES AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM PROBABILITIES.
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THIS, TO THE THREE SECONDS AND 28.5 MILES, AND JUST DEAL
WITH IT ON MY CROSS-EXAMINATION.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

I THINK THAT'S

APPROPRIATE.

Q

MR. MORIARITY:

THANK YOU.

(BY MR. JEFFS)

WOULD YOU MARK THAT ONE ALSO

FOR THE POSITION OF THE DODGE VAN.
A.

AT THE POSITION I SHOW AT 30 FEET IS WITH A

SPEED OF 6.8 MILES PER HOUR FOR THE DODGE.
Q.

YOU'VE ALSO SAID THAT THAT DODGE WAS AT A

SPEED FROM FIVE TO 10 MILES PER HOUR?
A.

YES.

Q.

TAKING IT AT 10 MILES PER HOUR, CAN YOU

CALCULATE THE POSITION OF THAT VEHICLE THREE SECONDS
PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT?
A.

YES.

10 MILES PER HOUR IS 15 FEET PER

SECOND, 14.6 FEET PER SECOND.
45 FEET.

SO TIMES THE 15 WOULD BE

AND COULD I USE A DIFFERENT PEN FOR THAT ONE.

40 AND 50 FEET IS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 134, AND I'LL DRAW
THAT HALFWAY BETWEEN THE FRONT END.
SO THE BLUE WOULD BE THE DODGE AT 10 MILES
PER HOUR AND THREE SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT.
Q.

DID YOU MAKE A CALCULATION OF THE POSITION OF

THE VEHICLES ONE AND A HALF SECONDS BEFORE IMPACT?
A.

I DID.
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MR. JEFFS:

NO QUESTIONS.

THE COURT:

ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

MR. MOODY:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. CHIPMAN :
THE COURT:
MR. HARRIS:

NONE.

MAY THE WITNESS BE EXCUSED?
PLEASE.

THE COURT:

YOU MAY STEP DOWN.

MR. HARRIS:

DR. ERIN BIGLER.

THE COURT:

IF YOU'LL BE SEATED.

I WOULD

REMIND YOU YOU 'VE BEEN PREVIOUSLY PLACED UNDER OATH.
(WITNESS PREVIOUSLY SWORN)
(CONTINUED TESTIMONY OF DR. ERIN BIGLER)
THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

MR. HARRIS:

PLEASE.

MAY THE WITNESS BE

EXCUSED?
HE'S GOT A BUNCH OF

PATIENTS IN SALT LAKE.
THE COURT:
MR. HARRIS:

YOU MAY CALL YOUR NEXT WITNESS.
IT WAS MY INTENTION AT THIS

TIME, THE ]LAST IS TO SIMPLY READ ABOUT — I HATE TO DO
IT AGAIN, ]BUT READ A BUNCH OF PAGES FROM NEWELL KNIGHT'S
DEPOSITION , WHICH I TOOK ON THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL 1993.
AND I WOULD JUST ASK THAT -— I'LL READ BOTH PARTS AND DO
IT QUICKLY AND BE FINISHED.
THE COURT:

ANY OBJECTION?

MR. JEFFS:

NOT TO THE GENERALIZATION HE

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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WANTS TO READ SOME PARTS.

AND AS FAR AS MR. KNIGHT'S

BACKGROUND IS CONCERNED, I INFORMED THE COURT EARLIER WE
WOULD NOT AGREE TO A READING OF THE DEPOSITION, AND WE
HAD OBJECTIONS TO FOUNDATION AND HIS TESTIMONY.
THE COURT:

VERY WELL.

WE'LL NEED TO HAVE

MR. KNIGHT CALLED AS A WITNESS.
MR. HARRIS:

YOUR HONOR —

MR. CHIPMAN:

HE'S OUT IN THE HALL.

MR. HARRIS: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH BEFORE
WE DO THAT?
THE COURT:

YOU MAY.

(BENCH CONFERENCE HELD)
THE COURT:

IF YOU'LL RAISE YOUR RIGHT-HAND,

THE CLERK WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH TO YOU.

NEWELL KNIGHT
CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

THE COURT:

IF YOU'LL BE SEATED IN THE

WITNESS CHAIR.
MR. HARRIS:

YOUR HONOR, IF I MIGHT, I JUST

WANT TO REMIND THE JURY THAT MR. KNIGHT IS AN ACCIDENT
RECONSTRUCTIONIST SPECIALIST WHO WAS DESIGNATED BY
DEFENDANT, PLEASANT GROVE CITY, IN THIS CASE AS THEIR
CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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EXPERT ON RECONSTRUCTION.

AND I WAS ALLOWED TO TAKE HIS

DEPOSITION ON THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL 1993, FOLLOWING
MR. CHIPMAN'S DESIGNATION.

I WOULD LIKE TO READ CERTAIN

PORTIONS OF THAT.
THE COURT: VERY WELL, YOU MAY DO SO.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARRIS:
Q.

THIS WILL BE THE EASIEST EXAMINATION YOU'VE

EVER HAD IN YOUR LIFE, MR. KNIGHT.

I'M GOING TO GET

FOUR OR FIVE YES'S OUT OF YOU, SO JUST SIT BACK AND
RELAX.
A.

I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT BEFORE.

WE'LL SEE. AND

I WAS TOLD THAT BY ATTORNEYS, ALSO.
Q.

YES.

I'M STARTING AT PAGE NUMBER 3,

MR. KNIGHT, AT LINE 6.

AND BASICALLY I'M GOING TO READ

ALONG, AND ASK YOU IF WHAT I'VE READ IS CORRECT, AND
THEN WE'LL MOVE ON TO THE NEXT.

I'VE ONLY GOT ABOUT 25

PERCENT OR SO OF THIS TO READ.
A.

YOU DON'T WANT ME TO READ MY ANSWERS?

Q.

I'LL BE HAPPY TO READ THEM.
THE COURT:

REMEMBER WE HAVE A REPORTER

THAT'S SUPPOSED TO BE TAKING THIS DOWN.
MR. HARRIS:

CREED AND I HAD A LONG TALK LAST

NIGHT.
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HAVE NO CONVERSATION ON ANY TOPIC WITH THE ATTORNEYS,
PARTIES OR WITNESSES.

AND WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL

1:00.
(NOON RECESS HELD)
THE COURT:

THE RECORD MAY SHOW THE JURY IS

ALL PRESENT, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF, COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANTS ARE PRESENT.

AND THE WITNESS HAS RESUMED THE

STAND.
AND MR. JEFFS, YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q.

MR. KNIGHT, YOU HAVE DONE ACCIDENT

RECONSTRUCTION FOR 20 PLUS OR MORE YEARS; HAVE YOU NOT?
A.

TRUE.

Q.

AND ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION AS A COMPLETE

FUNCTION DEPENDS UPON THE GATHERING OF VARIOUS ITEMS OF
DATA IN ORDER TO DO THE WORK; DOES IT NOT?
A.

IT DOES.

Q.

IN THIS CASE, AM I CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING

THAT YOU DID NOT UNDERTAKE TO DO A REGULAR ACCIDENT
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE ACCIDENT?
A.

THAT'S TRUE.

Q.

FROM THE READING OF YOUR DEPOSITION, WHICH I

WAS NOT PRESENT FOR, IT APPEARS TO ME WHAT YOU WERE
CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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A.

YES.

I NOT ONLY WAS CONVERSANT WITH THEM, I

SAT ON THE TRAFFIC —

LET'S SEE, IT WAS THE

TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY TRAFFIC COMMITTEE FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH FOR ABOUT A 10 YEAR PERIOD, AND WAS A
PARTICIPANT IN THE REVISION OF THE TRAFFIC CODE SEVERAL
TIMES.
Q.

BASED UPON THAT EXPERIENCE AND YOUR OWN

EXPERIENCE IN ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION, DO YOU HAVE AN
OPINION, BASED UPON YOUR EXPERTISE AND REASONABLE
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION PRINCIPALS, OF WHO HAD THE
RIGHT-OF-WAY ON THIS INTERSECTION AT THIS TIME?
MR. HARRIS:

YOUR HONOR, MAY I APPROACH THE

BENCH?
THE COURT:

YOU MAY.

(BENCH CONFERENCE HELD)
MR. HARRIS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
MR. JEFFS:

WOULD YOU READ THE QUESTION BACK?

(RECORD READ)
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS) ANSWER THAT YES OR NO.

A.

YES.

Q.

ON WHAT DO YOU BASE THAT OPINION?

A.

I BASE IT FIRST OF ALL ON THE TRAFFIC CODE.

SECONDLY, ON THE DISTANCE THAT THE SMITH VEHICLE WENT
AFTER ENTERING THE INTERSECTION AND THE POSITION OF THE
TOUCHING WITHIN THAT INTERSECTION, BECAUSE THAT TELLS ME
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WHO GETS THERE FIRST.
Q.

ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU RELIED UPON IN THAT

REGARD?
A.

WELL, IT WOULD BE ALL OF THOSE THINGS, THOSE

AS A PACKAGE.

THEN YOU LOOK TO SEE WHO HAS

RIGHT-OF-WAY.
Q.

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION?
MR. HARRIS: AND I WOULD RENEW MY OBJECTION,

YOUR HONOR; FOUNDATION, IT'S OUTSIDE THE SCOPE, AND I
ALSO THINK IT'S INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT
INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHAT THE ROLE IS, RATHER THAN
HAVING AN EX-HIGHWAY PATROLMAN INSTRUCT THE JURY.
THE COURT:

I'LL PERMIT HIM TO GIVE HIS

OPINION.
THE WITNESS:

MY OPINION OF WHO HAD THE

RIGHT-OF-WAY?
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS) YES.

A.

MR. SMITH DID.

HE GOT THERE FIRST.

MR. JEFFS: THANK YOU, THAT'S ALL.
MR. MOODY:

NO QUESTIONS.

MR. CHIPMAN:
THE COURT:

NOTHING, YOUR HONOR.

MR. HARRIS.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARRIS:
Q.

BASED UPON ALL THIS EXPERIENCE YOU HAD AS A

HIGHWAY PATROLMAN, DO YOU THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE THAT
THERE'S SOME KIND OF A RACE TO THE INTERSECTION?
A.

I HAVE NEVER SAID THAT.

I DON'T BELIEVE —

Q.

IT'S NOT APPROPRIATE, IS IT?

A.

ABSOLUTELY NOT.

Q.

AND ONE —

FOR EXAMPLE, MR. SMITH HERE, HE

COULD NOT SPEED UP OR ACCELERATE TO TRY AND MAKE HIMSELF
BE THE FIRST ONE THERE AT THE INTERSECTION, COULD HE?
A.

WELL, THE STATUTE DOESN'T SAY THAT. THE

STATUTE DOES NOT ADDRESS THAT.

BUT YOU WOULD NOT EXPECT

THAT MOST PEOPLE WOULD RACE TO BE FIRST.

BUT THAT'S --

THAT'S ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE RULE.
Q.

NOW THE STATUTE ALSO SAYS, DOES IT NOT, THAT

THOSE THAT REACH THE INTERSECTION AT APPROXIMATELY THE
SAME TIME, THE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR WHO HAS THE
RIGHT-OF-WAY UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES?
A.

THAT'S RIGHT.

THAT'S A SUBPART OF THAT SAME

SECTION OF THE CODE.
Q.

AND IF THEY REACH THERE APPROXIMATELY THE

SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE RIGHT-OF-WAY IS TO WHOM?
A.

WELL —

Q.

DON'T WE HAVE TO DETERMINE WHO IS RIGHT AND
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WHO IS LEFT?
A.

YOU MEAN IN POSITION?

Q.

YES, SIR.

A.

IF YOU GO TO THE B SECTION —

I REFER TO IT

AS THE B SECTION, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT IT USED TO BE.

IF

YOU REFER TO THE B SECTION, IT SAYS THAT THEN YOU LOOK
TO SEE WHO IS ON THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT IF THEY
APPROACH -- AND IT USE TO SAY "AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME
TIME."

BUT THE LEGISLATURE IN THEIR WISDOM CHANGED

THAT.
Q.

DO YOU THINK THE STATUTE HAS BEEN CHANGED?

A.

I KNOW IT'S BEEN CHANGED.

I'LL GIVE YOU THE

DATES IF YOU WOULD LIKE IT.
Q.

YOU DON'T THINK THE STATUTE CONTAINS ANY KIND

OF LEFT TO RIGHT?
A.

OH NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT AT ALL.

I SAID THE

STATUTE HAD BEEN CHANGED.
Q.

YES.

A.

AND I'LL GIVE YOU THE DATES OF THE CHANGES,

BUT IT DOES HAVE THE LEFT AND DOES HAVE THE RIGHT.
Q.

CURRENTLY?

A.

ABSOLUTELY.

Q.

HAD IT BEFORE, HAD IT AFTER?

A.

NO -- WELL, YEAH, IT HAD IT BEFORE, BUT

DIDN'T HAVE THE A SECTION FROM '78 TO '79. WE GOT RID
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A.

THANK YOU.

I'LL MAKE SURE YOU GET PAID FOR

THAT
MR. HARRIS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
THE COURT: MR. JEFFS.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. JEFFS:
Q.

MR. KNIGHT, YOU REFERRED TO THE SECTION AS AN

"A" SECTION.
A.

I THINK IT'S NOW SUBSECTION 1?

TRUE.
MR. HARRIS:

IT'S WHERE THE YELLOW STICKER

IS, NEWELL.
1
THE WITNESS: THAT HELPS.
Q

(BY MR. JEFFS)

COULD YOU GIVE US WHAT THE

TERM OF THE STATUTE IS IN THE FIRST SECTION OF THAT
CODE ?
A.

1
THE FIRST SECTION, WHICH I CALL THE "A," AND

THAT WAS BECAUSE I REMEMBERED THE OLD ONE.

IT SAYS.

"THE OPERATOR OF A VEHICLE APPROACHING AN
INTERSECTION NOT REGULATED BY AN OFFICIAL
TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE SHALL YIELD THE
RIGHT-OF-WAY TO ANY VEHICLE THAT HAS ENTERED
THE INTERSECTION FROM A DIFFERENT HIGHWAY."
THAT'S THE FIRST ONE TO THE INTERSECTION
RULE.
1
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Q.

SO THE ONE THAT'S APPROACHING AN INTERSECTION

SHALL YIELD TO THE CAR THAT'S IN THE INTERSECTION?
A.

THAT'S RIGHT.

Q.

AND YOUR DETERMINATION IN THIS ONE WAS THAT

SMITH ENTERED THE INTERSECTION FIRST?
A.

IT HAS TO BE. THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT

THAT.
MR. JEFFS: THAT'S ALL.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARRIS:
Q.

WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU APPLY THAT, AS AN

EXPERT AND POLICE OFFICER OF SOME 20 YEARS, WHERE WE
HAVE A SITUATION HERE, FOR 27 YEARS THERE'S BEEN A STOP
SIGN HERE AND A STOP SIGN HERE AS MRS. CARRIER HEADS UP
1100 NORTH?
A.

OKAY.

Q.

AND AS THAT STATUTE READS, AS MRS. CARRIER --

PART ONE READS, AS MRS. CARRIER IS COMING TOWARDS THAT,
IT'S IN AN INTERSECTION THAT HAS TWO STOP SIGNS UP —
THAT IS A STOP SIGN REGULATED BY A TRAFFIC CONTROL
DEVICE; IS IT NOT?
MR. JEFFS:

OBJECTION, NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE

THE COURT:

I'LL PERMIT IT.

OF CROSS.
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Q

(BY MR. HARRIS)

THAT SAYS IF YOU HAVE A

SITUATION WHERE IT'S NOT REGULATED BY A TRAFFIC CONTROL
DEVICE, AS MRS. CARRIER IS COMING UP, THEN WHOEVER GETS
THERE FIRST, ASSUMING YOU DON'T RACE AND THINGS YOU AND
I TALKED ABOUT, THEN YOU HAVE A RIGHT-OF-WAY
DETERMINATION, CORRECT?
A.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A STOP SIGN IT'S AN OPEN

INTERSECTION, CORRECT.
Q.

SURE.

A.

I THOUGHT THAT'S WHAT YOU ASKED.

Q.

LET'S ANALYZE IT THE WAY IT WAS AS

MRS. CARRIER WAS DRIVING UP THE ROAD ON THAT DATE THAT
STOP SIGN IS GONE AND THAT STOP SIGN IS UP?
A.

THAT'S TRUE.

Q.

AS A HIGHWAY PATROLMAN IS THAT A REGULATED

INTERSECTION OR HALF REGULATED INTERSECTION; WHAT IS IT?
A.

LET ME STEP DOWN TO THE BOARD AND I'LL SHOW

Q.

YOU CAN DO WHATEVER YOU WANT, SURE.

YOU.
BUT ARE

YOU GOING TO ANSWER MY QUESTION?
A.

THAT'S WHAT I WAS GOING TO STEP DOWN THERE

Q.

CAN YOU GIVE ME A YES OR NO OR I DON'T KNOW?

A.

I FORGOT THE QUESTION.

Q.

ON THAT DATE WITH THE STOP SIGN BEING DOWN,

FOR.
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Q.

AND I SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN RECEIVED AS

EXHIBIT 19-A, AND ASK YOU IF THAT IS FAMILIAR TO YOU OR
AT LEAST THAT SCENE?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND DID YOU TELL ME WHERE YOU WERE AT WITH

REFERENCE TO ANYTHING IN THAT PICTURE WHEN YOU FIRST SAW
THE CARRIER VEHICLE?
A.

YES.

Q.

WHERE DID YOU VIEW THE CARRIER VEHICLE FROM?

A.

DO YOU WANT ME TO SHOW ON YOU THE PICTURE

HERE?
Q.

YES.

A.

I WAS APPROXIMATELY IN THIS AREA UP HERE

(WITNESS INDICATING ON EXHIBIT).
Q.

DID YOU SEE THE CARRIER VEHICLE IN YOUR VIEW

BETWEEN THE TREE AND THE HOUSE?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND YOU SHOWED ME WHERE YOU WERE AT WHEN YOU

SAW THAT?
A.

YES.

Q.

NOW, AFTER YOU SAW THAT VEHICLE, YOU ONLY SAW

IT IN THAT DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TREE AND THE HOUSE AS IT
WENT PAST YOUR VIEW, RIGHT?
A.

YES.

Q.

AFTER SHE GOT BEHIND THE TREE YOU COULDN'T
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ l 3 _

You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2)
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at
the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is
inoperative; or
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.
I
If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence.

EXHIBIT K

INSTRUCTION NO.

tfS

You are instructed that the Utah Code § 41-6-72(1) provides:
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection
not regulated by an official traffic-control device shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the
intersection from a different highway.

EXHIBIT L

3b

INSTRUCTION NO.
When
the

two vehicles

are

approaching

an

intersection

at

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

same time and arQr-zg^feg^ati nll.y thre^i^uae- distance from it,

the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it
is the duty of the driver

approaching

on the

left to yield

the

right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the rightof-way.

However,

intersection

first,

a

driver

nor

may

may

not

a driver

speed
take

the

up

to

enter

an

right-of-way

by

entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver.

In

order for a driver approaching from the left to take the rightof-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of
the driver approaching from the right.
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EXHIBIT M

INSTRUCTION NO.

&&"

You are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(1) provides:
(1)
The operator of a vehicle approaching an
intersection not regulated by an official trafficcontrol device shall yield the right-of-way to any
vehicle that has entered the intersection from a
different highway.
Your are instructed that the UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-72(2) provides:
(2)
When more than one vehicle enters or
approaches an intersection from different highways
at approximately the same time and the intersection:
(a) is not regulated by an official
traffic control device;
(b) is not regulated because the traffic
control device is inoperative; or
(c)
is regulated from all directions by
stop signs,
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the
vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer.

References:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-72(1)
§ 41-6-72(2)
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EXHIBIT N

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and
distance from it, the driver approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the duty
of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-of-way.
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering the
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left
to take the right-of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of the driver
approaching from the right.

EXHIBIT O

VOL X-Doc.# 2533
THE STATUTE SPECIFICALLY IN 41-6-72 (2). THE JUDGE HAS
TAKEN THAT AND NOT USED THE EXACT LANGUAGE, AND COMBINED
IT IN AN INSTRUCTION BY MR. CHIPMAN, AND ALSO COMBINED
WITH IT ON THE SAME PAGE, 41-6-72 (1). AND I THINK THEY
SHOULD SPECIFICALLY HAVE THE STATUTE QUOTED AND NOT HAVE
IT BE LAWYERIZED OR PUT OTHER DATA AND INFORMATION INTO
IT.

AND THEY SHOULD BE DONE SEPARATELY.

IN ESSENCE MY

INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN, BUT I THINK IN A COMBINED AND
CONDENSED FORM, WHICH MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE
JURY TO UNDERSTAND.

ALSO, THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF MY #19

WHICH IS -- LET ME MAKE IT SPECIFIC HERE.
A BUNCH OF OTHERS.

IT APPLIES TO

IT HAS AN INTRODUCTORY SENTENCE THAT

SAYS, "IF YOU FIND AFTER A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT WILLIAM ROGER SMITH WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE
IN VIOLATION OF AFOREGOING STATUTE, SUCH CONDUCT CREATES
A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE..." AND THAT PARAGRAPH I'VE
REQUESTED ON 19, 20, 21, 22 AND 23. AND ALTHOUGH THE
JUDGE HAS GIVEN A NUMBER OF THOSE INSTRUCTIONS, HE HAS
GIVEN IT WITHOUT THAT FINAL CLARIFATORY (SIC) SENTENCE,
WHICH I THINK APPLIES BACK TO THE PRIOR INSTRUCTION AND
HELPS THE JURY UNDERSTAND BETTER WHAT THEY'RE APPLYING
HERE.
OKAY, THEN WITH THE REST OF THOSE WE'RE UP TO
23.

I'VE ALREADY STATED MY LONE OBJECTION TO THOSE.

23, 24 AND 25 ARE ALL GIVEN IN ESSENCE, BUT THEY, AGAIN,
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

EXHIBIT P

VOL X-DoC.# 2538
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE.
NUMBER 31, THIS IS THE ONE RIGHT-OF-WAY
INSTRUCTION WHICH DOES NOT TAKE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF
THE STATUTE.

IT COMBINES BOTH OF THE POTENTIALLY

APPLICABLE STATUTES INTO ONE.

IT AGAIN USES —

REDUCES

IT TO PROSE, AND THOUGH THE COURT WAS KIND ENOUGH TO
MAKE SOME CHANGES TO THIS AND INSERT SOME OF THE STATUTE
SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, IT NONETHELESS COULD BE DONE MORE
ACCURATELY, MORE CLEARLY DONE FOR THE JURY IF IT WAS
BROKEN INTO TWO INSTRUCTIONS AND USE THE STATUTE ITSELF.
33, I DO NOT TAKE EXCEPTION TO.
32, I DO NOT TAKE EXCEPTION TO.
33, IS FINE.
34, IS FINE.
35, IS FINE.
THE ONLY CHANGES I WOULD LIKE IN 33, 34 AND
35, AGAIN IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FINAL PARAGRAPH ABOUT
WHAT THE EFFECT IS, THAT IT IS A PRESUMPTION AND REFERS
BACK TO THE PRIOR INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH ON THE
STATUTORY VIOLATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE ON
THAT.
NUMBER 36 IS THE DAMAGE INSTRUCTION, WHICH IS
TWO PAGES LONG, THE INTRODUCTORY DAMAGE INSTRUCTION.
I'VE TOLD THE COURT I THINK IT'S NEGATIVE IN TONE AND
ATTEMPTS TO DO TOO MUCH IN ONE INSTRUCTION.
CREED H. BARKER, CSR

AND IT

EXHIBIT Q
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3
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DEPOSITION OF:

Plaintiffs,
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SHIRLEY CARRIER,
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NEWELL G. KNIGHT
Civil No. 910400680
Judge Ray M. Harding
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10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of

11
12

April, 1993, the deposition of NEWELL G. KNIGHT,

13

produced as a witness herein, at the instance of the

14

plaintiffs herein, in the above-entitled action now

15

pending in the above-named court, was taken before

16

DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and

17

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing

18

at the hour of 3:30 p.m., of said day at the offices of

19

SPENCE, MORIARITY & SCHUSTER, 3325 N. University Ave.,

20

Suite 200-B, Provo, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to

21
22

notice.

23
24
25

Associated Professional Reporters
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1
2
3

Q.

(BY MR. J E F F S )

And you found

entered this intersection
A.

first?

I did.

4

MR. J E F F S :

5

MR. H A R R I S :

That's all

(Whereupon the deposition
was concluded at 5:25 p.m.)

7
*

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I have.

That's a l l .

6

8

that M r . Smith

*

*

